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If any factor entered importantly into the contest, other than the sheer and simple sentiment of the people, it probably was the superior generalship of the Unionist leaders and their better organization. It is conceded that they had the advantage in these respects. But, considered practically, superior generalship and organization in a political contest cannot be separated from crystallized public opinion. It is, in a large measure, the agency by which normal public opinion is crystallized and made effective, and will be, until each voter is able to formulate his opinion absolutely without aid, and equally able to effectuate that opinion. In a sense, it is public opinion working on public opinion. It is the stronger of a given faith helping the weaker of that same faith to be effective.

More to be thought about now, however, than the overwhelming Unionist victory is the effect it will have, not in the north of Ireland, but the south. Today, Sinn Fein is confronted with the fact that Ireland is governmentally divided, as it has been divided in sentiment. No longer are the differences within Ireland a matter of debate and conjecture as to outcome. There is an outcome, and that outcome is a fact which bulks large upon the horizon of Irish affairs.

With a parliamentary government set up in the north of Ireland, representing plainly the will of the far larger part of the people of that district, seeking and insisting upon continued union with England, it is inconceivable that England will agree to any plan for settlement of the Irish problem that will be unsatisfactory to the new government; certainly, it will agree to none that will offer any material danger to the interests represented by that government. This is equivalent to saying that, apart from any commitments against entire freedom for all of Ireland that Mr. Lloyd-George and his government have made in the past, a new condition has arisen which sets up an apparently insuperable barrier to entire freedom for the whole of the island voluntarily granted by England. What, then, will Sinn Fein do? Will it argue that Ireland is a natural unit, geographically, economically, and ethnologically; that the principle of self-determination does not apply to the north, and that it will continue its battle for complete freedom for all Ireland, irrespective of the views of Ulster? Or will it seek to set up a new nation upon a part of Ireland? Or will it, unwillingly, be forced to accept the Lloyd-George plan for an Ireland divided between two parliamentary governments, under the home-rule scheme? And, in which position will it command the larger measure of that public favor which has been given it freely in many parts of the world? At the present writing strong pleas for the amendment of the Irish Home Rule act are coming unexpectedly from the House of Lords. This is thought to be a happy augury.

LEANING TOWARD THE HOUSE DISARMAMENT PLANS

Recent developments indicate to many observers that the sudden withdrawal of opposition on the part of Administration leaders in the Senate to the Borah disarmament resolution, put forward in this session in the form of an amendment to the Naval Appropriation Bill, did not mean that President Harding is prepared to accept that resolution.

It was well understood shortly after Senator Borah put forward his plan, as an amendment to the Naval Bill, that the President did not approve it. From the best sources of information at the White House came the statement that, while the President was deeply interested in forwarding the movement for disarmament, he did not want his "hand forced." The implication was that the matter was one surrounded by many delicate problems, and the Administration would do better if left alone by Congress. When, however, a few days later, Senator Poindexter, in charge of the Naval Bill, withdrew opposition to the Borah plan, it was assumed in most quarters that the general situation had cleared so that the President would not feel himself embarrassed by adoption of the Borah resolution, or that the pressure for its adoption had become too strong to resist.

Now it appears to informed members of Congress, as well as to observers, that the sudden withdrawal of opposition to the Borah plan in the Senate was a bit of strategy, and that the Administration's objections to it will be effectuated through action originating in the House. Representative Porter, of Pennsylvania, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, has a substitute plan, which is expected to have potent support from friends of the Administration. Exactly what caused the decision to shift the contest to the House from the Senate, where Administration supporters insist they had sufficient votes to protect the President's views, cannot be stated. One theory is that some of the Administration's supporters would have been troubled somewhat in fighting the Borah plan. Another is that the President, an experienced legislator and a seeker of results with the least friction, felt that his aims could be achieved most easily and peacefully if the House passed a disarmament resolution satisfactory to him, and stood firmly for it in conference. In any event, there seems to be no doubt that the Administration favors the Porter plan, as reported from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

This plan, as will be seen by careful reading of the resolution, merely concurs in what the President has said on the subject of disarmament, and then adds a clause appropriating \$100,000 for expenses. It is noted by friends of the Administration that if any action is to be taken by Congress as to disarmament at this juncture, probably nothing could be more satisfactory to Mr. Harding than the Porter resolution. It seeks to take nothing from what the President has said, nor to add any directions, nor to point to any specific steps. It does nothing more than give its approval to the President, and to provide him with money to meet any necessary expenses.

The exact text of the Porter resolution follows:

JOINT RESOLUTION

Concurring in the declared purpose of the President of the United States to call an international conference to limit armaments.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That

the Congress hereby expresses its full concurrence in the declaration of the President in his address to Congress on April 12, 1921, that "We are ready to co-operate with other nations to approximate disarmament, but merest prudence forbids that we disarm alone," and, further, fully concurs in his declared purpose and intention to call an international conference to consider the limitation of armaments with a view to lessen materially the burden of expenditures and the menace of war; and that for the expenses preliminary to and in connection with the holding of such conference the sum of \$100,000, to be expended under the direction of the President, is hereby appropriated.

Congressional champions of the Porter resolution make the point that Congress should go no further than the passage of such a resolution, because disarmament, to become a fact, must be negotiated finally through treaties, and the treaty-making power is in the hands of the President, with only a negative power lodged in the Senate. With some asperity they hold that it would be presumptuous for Congress to attempt to direct the President as to whom he should deal with in negotiating on disarmament or as to the scope of his negotiations. They further hold that the Borah resolution attempts both of those things—telling the President with whom to negotiate, and what armaments to try to reduce, and what period the reduction should cover.

JOINT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the President of the United States to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs shall be substantially reduced during the next five years.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized and requested to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs of each of said Governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding or agreement is to be reported to the respective Governments for approval.

Another point made by the champions of the Porter resolution is that in handling the delicate phases of the disarmament question, President Harding will be strengthened by its passage. Saying nothing that adds to or takes from the President's expressions on the subject, the resolution voices approval and support of what has been said, and in view of the negation by the Senate of former President Wilson's negotiations with other nations, and the consequent possibility that foreign statesmen may have some question about the ability of an American President to hold the support of Congress, the sponsors of the Porter resolution think its oneness with the President's views may serve to reassure the men with whom Mr. Harding must deal. That, they argue, will be helpful.

It is taken for granted that Senator Borah will not yield the way to passage of the Porter resolution through both branches without a stubborn contest. He has indicated determination to fight, and if he does so the outcome cannot be definitely forecast, owing to the complications that may arise. However, the political judgment generally is that if the Administration cares to insist upon passage of the Porter resolution it can carry its point.

THE EGYPTIAN OUTBREAKS

INVESTIGATIONS made by agencies evidently open-minded and fair lead to the conclusion that the Egyptian outbreaks were due to religious animosities, complicated by racial antagonism. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, leader of the Nationist Turks, is credited with having been at work among the Egyptians, through agents. His efforts were directed primarily against the Greeks. The enemy of the Greeks to the east, he reached over Greece, it seems, to stir the Egyptian enmity against the Greeks in the west. That successful, and feeling running high against Greeks living in Egypt, the next and easy stage was the development of religious hatred—Mohammedan *versus* Christian.

The ordinary political feeling, such as that to be found in the clash of ambition between Said Zaghlul Pasha, Egyptian Nationalist leader, and the Prime Minister, Adly Yeghen Pasha, spokesman for the government, is held not to have been responsible for the outbreaks, although the cause of disturbances in the past. That is held to be true, although the first manifestations, outwardly, of the trouble were political, consisting in demonstrations against the Cabinet, and although Said Zaghlul Pasha has issued a statement professing friendship for Great Britain, but attacking the Cabinet and saying conditions can be remedied by its resignation.

Whether, as the well-informed believe, the trouble was racial and religious, rather than political, there is no question that it was one of the most serious upheavals in Egypt in many months. Late reports put the number of Europeans killed at 14 and the number of wounded at 69. Complete reports may run the figures higher. Authentic reports upon the number of natives killed or wounded have not been made, but it is assumed that in fighting so severe the native losses must have been numerous. At one period in the disturbances, it is reported, the rioting was so widespread and so difficult to suppress that it seemed possible the lives of the whole European population in and about Alexandria would be endangered.

Fortunately, the influence of the moderate and more responsible Egyptians began to be felt coincident with the appearance of British troops and the steaming into the harbor of a British warship. Viscount Allenby, not depending alone on military and naval power, has appealed to the native population to turn to peace and conciliation. Keeping free of native party politics, he declared the friendship Great Britain has for Egypt and her desire to see peace and content throughout the land. His effort is stated to have been approved by a substantial element of the natives and to have had beneficent effect generally. It was aided by the moderates among the natives, who deplored at once the violence and the